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ABSTRACT: In August 12, 2000, the Russian Oscar-class submarine Kursk (K-141) sank during a navy 
manoeuvre in the Barents Sea killing all 118 personnel on board. The vessel was powered by two nuclear 
reactors and carry nuclear missiles which can be armed. The disaster is well documented and encom-
passes many socio-technical elements influencing the sequence of events finally leading to wreckage. For 
this, the disaster is considered as an archetypical event which might highlight the advantages as well as 
the limitations of resilience assessment approaches, e.g. in comparison with established risk assessment 
methodology. For this the paper starts with results of a literature survey with resilience metrics and areas 
of technical applications. The Kursk disaster is reviewed by available literature and research reports by 
Root Cause Analysis. The causing aspects (events, procedures, human factors, etc.) are then structured 
and classified according to their relevance and impact on vessel’s resilience. In a next step, these aspects 
are contrasted to the risk assessment approach as defined, e.g. by ISO 31000. The methodological juxta-
position is intended to characterize the maturity level of resilience analysis in a real world framework as 
well as to elaborate major differences in validity of the underlying system analysis concepts. Finally, the 
pros and cons of the reviewing approach are discussed.
case was dealt with a root cause analysis (RCA), 
which was then used for the discussion on risk and 
resilience assessment.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 compiles definitions of risk, resilience 
and the comparison of major system management 
terms. Chapter  3 describes the chronology of 
major events and causative aspects of  the Kursk 
disaster and present a part of  the resilience iden-
tification. Based on sequence of major events 
differences in risk and resilience assessment are 
elaborated in chapter 4. The results are discussed 
in chapter 5.
2 TERMINOLOGY
There is extensive literature research on the defi-
nition of the term resilience, e. g. (Husseini et. al. 
2016, Francis et al. 2014). There is a consensus that 
resilience is concerned with socio-technical sys-
tems and their ability to respond to disturbances in 
order to maintain the specified performance. This 
paper follows the definition of (Lay et  al. 2015) 
who defines resilience by a set of system abilities:
Resilience: System abilities to respond to dis-
turbances, to monitor, to learn, and to anticipate 
developments.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the context of risk analysis, the term resilience 
is often used nowadays. It is noticeable that both 
a generally accepted definition of this term and 
consequently a metric of resilience are missing. 
The differences between risk and resilience assess-
ment often remain unclear, e. g. in connection with 
related terms such as availability, vulnerability, and 
Business Continuity Management (BCM). To a 
certain extent, this follows a tradition of dealing 
with indefinite terms such as, risk, which in turn 
is based on other terms that are not always clearly 
definable. For instance, there is a risk if  several fac-
tors coincide: danger, exposure and vulnerability 
(cf. (Lenz 2009)).
The paper is an attempt to work out the differ-
ences and similarities between the two concepts 
of risk and resilience, where the approach follows 
the idea of “learning by doing” system assess-
ments. An archetypical case was selected for this: 
The Kursk submarine disaster in 2000. On the 
one hand, a submarine is a self-contained socio-
technical system, which simplifies considerations. 
The case itself, in turn, can be presented from a 
variety of sources. One of us (A. Leksin) can refer 
to less well known Russian literature as well as on 
feedback of one Russian accident investigator. The 
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Responsiveness considers all kind of distur-
bances into account, all deviations from specified 
performance levels, both positive and negative 
impacts. The term “disturbance” indicates that 
point of view is dominated by negative impacts.
Furthermore, responsiveness indicates systems 
immediate response to disturbances. Hence resil-
ient systems are designed to react on disturbances 
in a self-managing way.
Looking at socio-technical system, humans are 
the carrier of its learning and anticipating abili-
ties as covered by system management processes. 
Monitoring can be done both automatically/tech-
nically and by humans also depending on surveil-
lance level.
The concept of risk is assumed to be known to 
the reader. The paper follows the well-established 
definition of risk of (Kaplan & Garrick 1981):
{Riski | si,fi,ci},
where:
Si: scenario identification or description
Fi: probability (or frequency) of that scenario
Ci:  consequence or evaluation measure of that 
scenario, i.e., the measure of damage.
The frequency/consequence concept of risk is 
also along to common risk management stand-
ards, e.g. (ISO 31000 2009). Risk figures are usu-
ally computed by fi⋅ci. Note, that scenario is not 
defined by (Kaplan & Garrick 1981) and (ISO 
31000 2009). The authors will use it in terms of 
(imagined) sequence of events. Probability is a 
measurement of uncertainty of (future) events 
based on (statistical) data. As a consequence, risk 
becomes a concept of proactivity and finally pre-
paratory by management.
Vulnerability is a well established term in IT 
security which is easily adaptable to any other 
engineered systems. According to (NIST 2012), 
the definition is:
Vulnerability: Weakness in an information sys-
tem, system security procedures, internal controls 
or implementation that could be exploited by a 
threat source.
For this, the understanding of vulnerability fol-
lows the keyhole principle and is an intrinsic sys-
tem property. Vulnerability management is then to 
reactively plug flaws.
However, the limits of the concepts are not 
always clear: According to (Lenz 2009:38–43.69), 
risk always coincides with danger, exposure and vul-
nerability. Additional components such as coping 
capacity and criticality (meaning and consequences 
upon entry) can be added to this assumption.
The concept of Business Continuity Manage-
ment is a related system maintaining process to 
risk, resilience and vulnerability management, as 
defined by (SBA 2013):
Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a 
company-wide approach designed to ensure that 
critical business processes can be maintained in the 
event of major internal or external incidents.
The view is the management of single (major) 
undesired events in order to minimise their impacts. 
The management objective is to maintain the spec-
ified business performance level.
3 THE SUBMARINE KURSK (K-141) 
DISASTER
The Kursk submarine disaster took place in the 
Barents Sea on 12 August 2000, killing all 118 per-
sonnel on board. In this paper, the course of the 
disaster, if  publicly known, serves as a test case for 
the methods of system analysis listed in chapter 1. 
The detailed description of the disaster is a signifi-
cant part of the resilience identification step which 
is explained in chapter 4.2. The authors process the 
Kursk catastrophe on the basis of publicly avail-
able information and present a possible sequence 
of events. Further discussions will then be held on 
this basis. The case covers all elements that make 
an analysis interesting from very different perspec-
tives, i.e. the interaction of people and technology 
in a stressful overall situation. However, the basic 
system performance remains simple: ensuring 
the safety and health of the crew. The question is 
to what extent the system analysis methods listed 
above would have been suitable for recognizing this 
accident in advance.
3.1 Event of the Kursk disaster
There are about 18 different disaster versions of 
the Russian Oscar-class submarine Kursk (K-141). 
Table 1. Comparison of major system management terms.
Term Connotation Intrinsic system property Management Focus
Risk negative no external interference (undesired) events
Resilience positive yes Intrinsic System performance
Vulnerability negative yes external interference (undesired) flaws
BCM positive no external interference (undesired) events
Availability positive yes external interference failures
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This paper considers one of the official versions—
an explosion of a torpedo but due to the influence 
of a second submarine. The chronology of major 
events and causative aspects (events, procedures, 
human factors, etc.) are structured and classified 
according to their relevance to give a better over-
view for the reader by describing only the impor-
tant steps of the disaster. The RCA breaks down 
a complex scenario into individual steps (black 
boxes in the RCA diagram of Figure  3), which 
ultimately indicate a cause-effect chain. Secondary 
event chains can be added (grey boxes). For better 
understanding the boxes are numbered. The event 
numbers can also be found in the case description.
The description of the significant factors which 
had a strong influence on the worst case scenario 
can be traced back to 1999. Kursk was on the mili-
tary mission in the Mediterranean Sea to monitor 
the United States Sixth Fleet responding to the 
Kosovo crisis. (1) After the successful mission 
the submarine returns into the stationing port of 
Vidyayevo. After a longer down time due to finan-
cial reason the commissioning of the submarine by 
the crew was under time pressure towards the end of 
May 2000 because of the Russian Navy large scale 
naval exercise planning for August 2000. Therefore 
the crew had a shortage of lack of planned training 
activities in the last approx. 9 months (2). But due 
to the last successful mission in the Mediterranean 
Sea, it cannot be ruled out that part of the crew 
was self-confident. Either because of time pressure 
and/or the incorrect planning of the Marine areas 
by the Military-Maritime Fleet of the Russian Fed-
eration (3), the way to the naval exercise area was 
over “underwater mountains” (4). Such manoeu-
vre through areas of not deep-water sites of the sea 
can be dangerous for an Oscar-class submarine and 
other submarines because it is difficult to manoeu-
vre due to radar shadows of sonar and magnetic 
interference. The threat obviously increases with 
the condition that other countries submarines are 
always present in such naval exercises.
On August 10th, 2000 the Kursk had begun 
the planned activities in the naval exercise near 
the Kola Bay. On August 12th, 2000 at 11:28 local 
time, two explosions were detected by various 
seismologists and hydroacoustics. The first explo-
sion corresponded for ≈500 [kg] TNT equivalent 
and after 135  seconds the second explosion with 
≈5000 [kg] TNT equivalent. Unfortunately the 
exact number of armed cruise missiles at the Kursk 
varied depending on references. Typical armament 
consist 24 of SS-N-19/P-700 Granit “Shipwreck” 
cruise missiles that were designed to defeat the 
best naval air defences. The missile containers are 
located on both sides of the deckhouse, outside 
the rugged boat hull. Based on the most references, 
photographic material and video footage the Kursk 
had during this naval exercise 24 of P-700 Granit 
“Shipwreck” cruise missiles on board. Due to the 
double hull construction of the Oscar-class sub-
marine, the second explosion of the P-700 Granit 
“Shipwreck” cruise missiles did not initiated. Con-
structors considered such worst-case scenario and 
reinforced the inner hull with high content stain-
less steel about 45–68 [mm] thick. There is 200–350 
[cm] gap to the 5–10 [mm] thick outer hull.
Therefore both detected explosions were in the 
1st torpedo compartment. As before the exact 
number of dummy and warshot torpedos varies 
from 8 to 18 and even 24. Weapons included 18 of 
SS-N-16 “Stallion” ( -6 “ ”), hydrogen 
peroxide-fueled Type 65 torpedo (65–76 ), USET-
80 ( -80) and their different types. Kursk was 
armed at that moment with dummy (65–76  and 
USET-80) and warshot (65–76 , USET-80) as 
well as torpedo VA-111 Shkval.
Figure 1. Example of the inner and outer hull construc-
tion with P-700 Granit “Shipwreck” cruise missiles on 
the bow side (Militaryarms 2017).
Figure  2. Characteristics of Oscar class submarine 
(Defending 2015).
Table  2. Explosive characteristics of USET-80 and 
VA-111.
USET-80 
 (warshot torpedo)
Total weight – 2000 kg 
explosive weight – 200/300 kg
VA-111 
(warshot torpedo)
Total weight – 2700 kg
combat unit – 200 kg
explosive weight  200 kg
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Although it was an exercise, Kursk loaded, as 
mentioned before, also with combat capable weap-
ons. This means that some of the torpedo tubes 
are constantly in combat readiness with an armed 
warshot torpedo. Warshot torpedo which was used 
by Kursk in military mission is typically the tor-
pedo USET-80. Table (2) shows short characteris-
tics of the torpedoes USET-80 and VA-111 Shkval.
Based on these characteristics, the possibility of 
an USET-80 in the torpedo tube is very high and 
its TNT equivalent is near to 500 [kg] (7). Also 
it was planned to launch the USET-80 torpedo as 
secondary in this naval exercise.
However, all versions of disaster reports agree 
on one—the first explosion was an explosion of a 
torpedo in a torpedo tube. As mentioned before, 
by all naval exercises other countries submarines 
are always present at the naval area as well as near 
main marine ports during the year. The history of 
underwater incidents between submarines is well 
known and documented in different languages and 
countries (Drew et  al. 1998). “Among the speci-
fied accidents there are several tens of collisions of 
submarines, including 20 underwater collisions of 
Russian Navy submarines with foreign submarines. 
From these 20 examples 11 were in grounds of 
combat trainings (naval exercises) on the way to the 
main stationing sites of the Northern and Pacific 
fleet, including 8 in the north and 3 in the Pacific 
Ocean in a short time period from 1968 till 1993” 
(Aleksin 2001, Viperson 2001). Several accidents 
have also been registered since 1993 till nowadays. 
On August 12th, 2000  Kursk prepares for shoot-
ing practice in the predetermined and surveyed 
area radio and radio engineering investigation of 
surface forces of “opponent—Kirov-class battle-
cruiser Pyotr Velikiy” (5). Due to force 3 at sea the 
speed of Kursk was approx. 8  knots. The Kursk 
had changes the depth level many times according 
to typical exercise. A second non-Russian subma-
rine which monitors Kursk the last two days (6.1) 
has lost the contact (6.2) and couldn’t find the 
Russian submarine (6.3). They decided to emerge 
on periscopic depth (6.4) to explain this situation 
in order to prove if  Kursk has also surfaced. On the 
way to periscopic depth the non-Russian subma-
rine unexpected struck (6.5) with the lower cornice 
of a bow part from a high angle of attack to the top 
area of the right bow side of Kursk where were tor-
pedo tube was charged with the warshot torpedo 
USET-80. Both submarines continue to move with 
a former speed (5.5 [m/s]), destroying each other’s 
hulls (6). Nuclear submarines of US and UK 
Navy are build only one 35–45 [mm] thick stainless 
steel hull. Thus Kursk damage was much higher. 
In a second after the struck with the torpedo tube 
located to the right board of Kursk it was crumpled 
on a half of the length which caused a detonation 
of the warshot torpedo USET-80 (7). This detona-
tion was on a line of least resistance to the hatch 
of the torpedo tube, destroying this and created a 
hole more as half a meter in diameter. Water flows 
inside the torpedo compartment and causes trim to 
the bow side (8). The captain of Kursk order to 
ascent and increase the speed (9). However short 
circuits of electrical networks happen because of 
water penetration (10) and due to this the emer-
gency system block both nuclear reactors (11.1). 
The Kursk was out of control (11.2) with a strong 
trim to the bow side and hits the seafloor (12). The 
second explosion was initiating with the impact on 
the floor (13). This explosion killed many crew 
members in the conning tower and control room 
(2 compartment), radioelectronics room (3 com-
partment), living room (4 compartment), room 
with diesel-generator, electrolysis installation for 
air regeneration, compressors of high pressure etc. 
(5 compartment). Although Kursk was designed 
Figure 3. Sequence of events in form of RCA.
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to withstand external pressure of depths of up to 
1.000 [m], the second internal explosion destroyed 
the bulkheads between the compartments (prob-
ably till the compartment 5) which are calculated 
for only 10 atmospheres.
The inner hull is designed for 60 atmospheres, 
which prevented the explosion of the P-700 Granit 
“Shipwreck” cruise missiles as mentioned before in 
this paper.
Based on the RCA and literature statistics on sim-
ilar incidents, the catastrophe must be considered by 
the submarine Kursk as an archetypal event. Next 
chapter discusses how such scenario could be imple-
mented in the prospective of classical risk analysis as 
well as the possible approach of a resilience concept 
and its implementation problems.
4 RISK AND RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT
The established system assessment process can be 
summarized by three steps: identification, analysis, 
evaluation. These processes are well defined in risk 
assessment while there are methodological gaps in 
resilience assessment.
The following subsections outline these gaps 
and point to differences in risk and resilience 
assessment by exemplary application to the Kursk 
disaster.
4.1 Risk assessment
The established approaches and concepts of risk 
assessment are presumably known to the reader (i.e., 
how to perform Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and others).
Also in risk assessment, a study starts with 
determination of system boundaries. When fol-
lowing the risk management process of, e.g., ISO 
31000, then risk assessment includes the (technical) 
system, where the remaining risk managing proc-
esses are beyond. With regard to resilience assess-
ment (cf. chapter  4.2), risk studies are based on 
a restricted system definition. As a consequence, 
some boxes of RCA in Figure 3 are excluded (the 
results of all selection criteria as compiled in this 
chapter are applied on RCA of the Kursk disaster 
and summarized in Table 3).
There are studies of navy available to support 
out established risk assessment approaches, e.g., 
(Holmboe et  al. 1992) on likelihoods of threats, 
maturity of technologies, systems potential to 
develop a threat scenario.
The identification process starts with the speci-
fication of hazards and threats as well as vulner-
abilities of the system and system components.
Hazard is commonly defined as a condition, 
circumstance or process what can cause dam-
age. Furthermore, hazard is limited to accidental, 
undesired and sudden events.
Risk analysis needs the quantification of fre-
quency and likelihood of an undesired event. 
Figure 5 shows the risk analysis model as applied 
by the authors.
The terms in Figure 5 are specified by:
•	 hazards are characterised by possibilities,
•	 results of threat factors. Scenario analysis used 
to anticipate how threats and opportunities 
might develop and are used for all types of risk 
with short and long term time frames,
Figure  4. Compartments of Kursk (Naked-science 
2017).
Table  3. Risk analysis relevant actions according to 
RCA.
RCA  
steps Action H T V S&S C
2 negative + − + n.r. −
3 negative + − + n.r. −
4 negative + + − n.r. +
5 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
6 negative + + + + +
7 negative + + + + +
8 negative + + + + +
9 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
10 negative + − + + +
11.1 positive n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. +
11.2 negative + − − − +
12 negative + + − + +
13 negative + + + + +
End negative + + + + +
+: relevant impact regarding risk analysis; −: no-impact 
on defined system; n.r.: not relevant for risk analysis.
Figure 5. Risk analysis model.
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•	 destruction of objects as a result of hazards are 
characterized by conditional probability,
•	 unavailability of safety and security systems 
because of combinations of non-reliability, 
human factors among others, are quantified 
by probabilities of scenario development from 
emergencies towards accident.
Depending on analysis goals (quantitative or 
qualitative) different approaches are in use. The 
Russian Army carries out FTA (personal com-
munications with Saint Petersburg State Institute 
of Technology). However, FTA does not con-
sider positive events and an analysis of top event 
Recessed submarine is then incomplete. The fail-
ure analysis based on qualitative approaches, as 
FMEA, could be added.
Within this defined framework for risk analysis 
Table 3 shows the relevant boxes of the RCA.
The selection process for identifying the RCA 
boxes relevant to risk analysis bases on the follow-
ing rules:
Rule 1:  The box event is within the defined system 
boundary.
Rule 2:  The hazard is relevant within the defined 
system boundary.
Rule 3:  If  a threat (from outside) exists, it is taken 
into account.
Rule 4:  Searching for vulnerabilities in the system.
Rule 5:  Investigation of safety and security systems 
is a special task of risk analysis.
Rule 6:  Negative consequences are always relevant 
for risk analysis independent from threats 
and vulnerabilities.
Thus, step preparing shooting exercise (5) is 
not relevant from the view of risk assessment. The 
order by the captain (9) is a positive measure and, 
thus not relevant for the defined scenario. The 
automatic shutdown of the nuclear reactor (11.1) is 
not part of the risk analysis because it is a planned 
safety process. Steps (2) and (3) are only consid-
ered in human reliability analysis. Finally risk is 
often evaluated by risk matrix. However, the risk 
evaluation process is not subject of this paper.
4.2 Resilience assessment
As mentioned in chapter  2, resilience considers 
extended socio-technical systems where (human 
as well as automated) actors are responsible for 
actions to positively or negatively affect system 
responsive-ness. Applied resilience assessment 
by case study brings further differences to risk 
assessment in understanding to light. The system 
assessment processes (i.e. aspect identification, 
analysis and evaluation) structures the following 
discussion.
System performance is a matter of documented 
system design specifications and other characteris-
tics of embedding system entities. Then, resilience 
assessment of the Kursk disaster comprises all 
involved submarines and crews as well as the entire 
Northern Military-Maritime Fleet of the Rus-
sian Federation at the moment of the exercise and 
impacts from sea environment. The impact on the 
environment is not relevant. Hence, you can eas-
ily define actions, actors, and system boundaries in 
Kursk example in contrast to, e.g., infrastructures. 
Within this framework, the identification process 
starts with the specification of system perform-
ance P. For this, two approaches are common in 
resilience assessment (cf., e.g., Mock 2018): either 
the analysts decide to model time-depending per-
formance P(t) or they compile a set of n resilience 
impacting aspects P  =  {a1; a2; …;an}. P(t) can 
be easily defined (e.g. safe and secure transport 
of crew and cargo during mission time) but find-
ing a corresponding measurement is not always 
as straightforward as, e.g. oxygen content of the 
breathing air during mission time. Note, that avail-
ability, as shown in Table 1, is a performance model 
P(t) showing the probability course of operability 
of a system. Maintenance and repair are consid-
ered as activities to keep the system resilient, and 
are actions of responsiveness.
The identification process by compilation of a 
set of aspects influencing resilience appears plain, 
e.g. the number of redundancies of life supports 
systems, educational level of crew, repair, etc. 
However, time dependency and the representation 
of systemic relationships are lost then.
The resilience analysis process by P(t) follows the 
common processes of formal mathematical/physical 
of system modelling and simulation and will not be 
discussed here. However, the RCA presentation of 
the Kursk disaster in Figure 3, which follows a time-
line of succeeding events, is considered as a simple 
representor of P(t) after revision towards resilience 
(see Table 4). P(t) analysis needs the specification 
of normal operation bandwidths of total system 
performance. For instance, the oxygen content on 
a submarine can be above or below a lethal thresh-
old. The life support system may be able to provide 
a breathable atmosphere again, but this can be too 
late for the crew. In terms of resilience analysis, the 
responsiveness of the entire submarine system is lost 
as safe transport has ended. These points to specific 
views in resilience analysis: Total loss of perform-
ance or functionality (worst case) is excluded from 
analysis (“If dead you are not resilient any longer”). 
The analysis of impacting aspects P needs the defini-
tion of a resilience metric which is still under discus-
sion in academia. Table 4 summarises the findings 
in resilience identification and analysis by the Kursk 
example as represented in Figure 3.
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As figured out in Table  2, resilience assess-
ment ends with the loss of control of the Kursk 
(“If  faint, then you are no longer resilient”). Step 
(6) can be similarly analysed by considering RCA 
steps (6.1) to (6.6) which introduces the second 
submarine into analysis. The marine environment 
(step (4)) has been identified as challenging for 
submarines which does not support safe transport.
Resilience evaluation is the process of assess-
ment. Again, the analyst depends on how resilience 
analysis been performed. In case of modelling 
P(t) a characteristic value needs to be defined, e.g. 
the ratio of resilient operation mode to total mis-
sion time. This is equivalent, e.g. to reliability and 
availability analysis. The evaluation of the set of 
impacts P needs the definition of a resilience met-
ric comparable to risk prioritisation value RPV in 
risk analysis and provided by FMEA. Evaluation 
criteria of acceptance/non-acceptance of resilience 
analysis results still needs to be defined (a resilience 
priority value is introduced in (Mock 2018)).
4.3 Synopsis
Based on RCA every single step is discussed from 
the side of resilience assessment in comparison to 
the risk assessment. Table  5 differs between the 
selections of yes (Y), no (N).
Avoidance of worst case scenario or disaster is 
the aim of a risk assessment. Therefore, positive or 
neutral (from the view of risk analysis) steps such 
(1), (3), (5), (6.1), (6.2) are not considered. But 
e.g. step (9) could be considered if  the order of the 
captain is incorrect. Step (2) can be also considered 
only in case of human reliability analysis. Equiva-
lent to a worst case scenario “meltdown of nuclear 
reactor”, step (13) must be take into account by 
this disaster. Similar, step (6) could correspond to 
a “plane crash on nuclear power plant” scenario 
(external event). Step (5) is not a malfunction or 
optimization, but an important point in the overall 
process. Due to the defined performance indicator 
step (6.2) must be considered too (the second sub-
marine is part of the whole system). As mentioned 
before, with defined performance indicator—safe 
implementation of the naval exercise for the crew—
the resilience analysis ends with the step (10). As 
mentioned in chapter 2, risk assessment often uses 
the basic frequency/consequence definition to get 
calculation values. However, the next step after 
description of the RCA from the side of resilience 
Table  4. Resilience assessment for performance “safe 
and secure transport of Kursk crew and cargo during 
mission time”.
RCA Sub-system P Action Actor(s)
1 fleet + success Kursk  
crew,  
fleet
2 Kursk
−
Kursk  
crew
3 fleet
−
preparedness Kursk  
crew,  
fleet
4 environment
−
5 Kursk + exercise Kursk  
crew
6 Kurs, other  
sub.
−
ram Both  
crews
7 Kursk
−
explosion
8 Kursk
−
leakage
9 Kursk + order Kursk’s  
captain
10 Kursk n.r short-circuit,  
loss of  
control
11.1 Kursk n.r shutdown  
reactor
11.2 Kursk n.r loss of  
control
12 Kursk,  
environment
n.r grounding,  
loss of  
control
13 Kursk n.r detonation,  
loss of  
control
End Kursk n.r
+/−: positive/negative impact on resilience; n.r.: not rel-
evant for resilience assessment purposes.
Table 5. Juxtaposition of risk and resilience assessment.
RCA events Risk assessment Resilience assessment
1 N Y
2 N Y
3 N Y
4 Y Y
5 N ?
6 Y Y
6.1 N Y
6.2 N Y
6.3 Y Y
6.4 ? Y
6.5 ? Y
7 Y Y
8 Y Y
9 N/Y Y
10 Y N
11.1 Y N
11.2 Y N
12 Y N
13 Y N
Summary Y: 10 of 19 Y: 13 of 19
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analysis is complicated due to absence of any use-
ful values and equations which could be support 
the calculations and as a result the evaluation of 
the defined system and performance indicator.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Resilience assessment should be different from 
risk assessment and other related concepts and 
approaches. For instance, risk assessment is basi-
cally restricted to undesired events and does not 
cover the extended view of technical systems. On 
the other hand, event identification highly depends 
on the definition of system performance indicating 
resilience as a measurement of system quality.
The issue of applied resilience assessment is 
shown by considering the archetypical case of 
Kursk submarine disaster. The detailed description 
of sequence of steps by Root Cause Analysis shows 
that a precious accident analysis is significant for 
identification of aspects which have impacts on 
resilience. The specification of system perform-
ance and the view of extended socio-technical 
systems increase resource requirements (time, 
expertise, etc.) of auditing. This way of thinking 
definitely uncovers additional elements of system 
disturbances.
However, resilience analysis is still in its begin-
nings and there is no commonly accepted meth-
odology and metric. In summary, resilience 
assessment is different to risk assessment in some 
ways and shows promising aspects in extended sys-
tem analysis. However, further steps towards oper-
ationalisation of the resilience concept are needed.
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